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DRAWING THE LINE ON LEGISLATIVE 
PRIVILEGE: INTERPRETING STATE SPEECH OR 
DEBATE CLAUSES IN REDISTRICTING 
LITIGATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution and forty-three state constitutions 
include a Speech or Debate Clause granting legislators a legal privilege for 
their legislative work.1 Although there is a well-developed body of federal 
Speech or Debate Clause law granting an absolute privilege to legislators, 
case law interpreting many state Speech or Debate Clauses is 
undeveloped.2 One context in which state Speech or Debate Clauses are 
tested is redistricting litigation.3 State courts provide a desirable forum for 
challengers seeking to expose partisan gerrymandering in redistricting 
plans.4 Because the potential for exposing partisan gerrymandering 
increases if state legislators’ statements and legislative documents are 
accessible, many observers have concluded that Speech or Debate Clause 
protections should be watered down in the redistricting context.5 However, 
failing to strongly enforce state Speech or Debate Clause protections 
would lead to negative effects for representative democracy.6 Rather than 
weaken Speech or Debate Clause protections, a better solution is to restrict 
the free reign of partisan legislators over the redistricting process by using 
independent commissions. 
Part I of this Note traces the history and development of the federal 
 
 
 1. See Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State 
Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 221 (2003). The Speech or Debate Clause of the 
Constitution states: “[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Members of Congress] shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 2. See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.  
 3. See, e.g., Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d 469 (Va. 2016); Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976 
(R.I. 1984); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 
2013). 
  4. See infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. First, challengers do not face the justiciability 
hurdle erected by Veith v. Jubilirer that litigants face in federal court. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Second, 
states are a natural place to litigate redistricting claims because redistricting is a process almost wholly 
governed and controlled by states. Third, states impose many requirements on the redistricting process 
that a plaintiff could challenge. See also League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 
(Fla. 2015) (invalidating a Florida congressional map as a partisan gerrymander). 
  5. See, e.g., Christopher Asta, Note, Developing a Speech or Debate Clause Framework for 
Redistricting Litigation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 238, 265–66 (2014); see also League of Women Voters of 
Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 2013); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of 
Elections, 114 F. Supp. 3d 323, 332–36 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
6. See generally Huefner, supra note 1.  
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Speech or Debate Clause and legislative privilege with an emphasis on 
Supreme Court case law. Part II summarizes major trends in state court 
interpretation of state Speech or Debate Clause cases. Part III examines 
state Speech or Debate Clause treatment in the context of redistricting 
litigation and surveys relevant state supreme court cases. Finally, Part IV 
proposes a framework for approaching state Speech or Debate Clauses in 
state redistricting litigation and explores the feasibility of independent 
redistricting commissions as a solution to redistricting problems. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL SPEECH OR 
DEBATE CLAUSE AND LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE 
Part I briefly traces the history and development of the federal Speech 
or Debate Clause and legislative privilege. It begins by examining the 
origins of the Speech or Debate Clause in English history and the 
development of the Speech or Debate Clause in the early American legal 
tradition. This Part also reviews modern Supreme Court decisions on the 
Speech or Debate Clause, delineating the Court’s key rationales for the 
legislative privilege and the scope of the privilege. 
The Speech or Debate Clause dates to the sixteenth century in the 
English Parliament.7 It was first included in the English Bill of Rights in 
1689.8 The Speech or Debate Clause originated as a means of protecting 
the will of the people.9 It developed in the context of Parliament’s 
struggles in seventeenth-century England to assert itself as an independent 
government body, separate from the Crown.10 The legislative privilege 
embodied in the Speech or Debate Clause grew stronger as Parliament 
became increasingly independent from the Crown in the seventeenth 
century.11  
The Speech or Debate Clause quickly became established in the 
American colonies.12 After the Revolutionary War, the legislative 
 
 
7. CARL WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 21 (1920). 
8. Huefner, supra note 1, at 229–30; 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, §9 (1689) (Eng.), reprinted in 9 DANBY 
PICKERING, STATUTES AT LARGE 67, 69 (Joseph Bentham 1764). 
9. Huefner, supra note 1, at 229–30. The broad rationale being that protecting members of 
parliament was tantamount to protecting the interests of the people against those of the monarch. See 
infra note 25–26 and accompanying text. 
10. Huefner, supra note 1, at 229–30.  
11. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951). 
12. MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 70 
(1943). For example, Maryland, Virginia, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Georgia, and North Carolina each had legislative privilege provisions in their charters or bills of rights 
prior to the Constitutional Convention. Id. 
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privilege was “deemed so essential for representatives of the people” that a 
Speech or Debate Clause was included in the Articles of Confederation 
and, later, in the Constitution.13 The separation of powers and the principle 
of representative government were two paramount concerns animating the 
inclusion of the Speech or Debate Clause in the Constitution and state 
constitutions.14 These fundamental concerns, coupled with the Speech or 
Debate Clause’s rich history,15 indicate that any proposed encroachment 
on the legislative privilege embodied in the Clause should be taken 
seriously. 
Modern federal case law also justifies a robust Speech or Debate 
Clause on two main grounds: separation of powers and legislative 
efficiency.16 The Supreme Court first interpreted the federal Speech or 
Debate Clause in the 1881 case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.17 In Kilbourn, the 
Court applied the federal Speech or Debate Clause to protect members of 
the House from being sued for false imprisonment after they declared a 
subpoenaed witness in contempt of Congress and ordered his arrest.18 The 
Court found that the House members were acting in their official 
capacities as legislators, and thus were protected from suit by the Speech 
and Debate Clause.  
Following the Kilbourn decision, eleven Supreme Court decisions 
greatly expanded judicial treatment of the Speech or Debate Clause in a 
narrow window of time concentrated in the late 1960s and early 1970s.19 
 
 
13. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372. 
14. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. XXX, pt. I (“The freedom of deliberation, speech, and 
debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the 
foundation of any action, complaint, or prosecution, in any other court or place whatsoever.”) 
(emphasis added). See also 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 336 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner 
eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1987) (emphasizing the importance of legislative privilege to the separation 
of powers and representative democracy).  
15. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 863 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, 
and Co. 1833) (“[W]ithout [the Speech or Debate Clause] all other privileges would be comparatively 
unimportant, or ineffectual. This privilege also is derived from the practice of the British parliament, 
and was in full exercise in our colonial legislatures, and now belongs to the legislature of every state in 
the Union, as matter of constitutional right.”). 
16. See Asta, supra note 5, at 245 (articulating the consistent rationales of separation of powers 
and legislative effectiveness in Supreme Court justifications of legislative immunity and privilege). 
17. 103 U.S. 168 (1881). 
18. Id. at 169. Kilbourn had been subpoenaed to testify about the bankruptcy of the firm Jay 
Cooke & Co. Id. at 171–72. After he refused to cooperate with the House committee conducting the 
investigation, the House members held Kilbourn in contempt and took him into custody. Id. at 173–77. 
Kilbourn successfully challenged the ability of the House to hold a subpoenaed witness in contempt. 
Id. at 196. However, the Court invoked the Speech or Debate Clause to block any retaliatory action 
against the House members by Kilbourn. Id. at 204–05. 
19. See Huefner, supra note 1, at 250. The cases are: Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 
(1951); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); 
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Each of these decisions references the historic separation of powers 
rationale, and the cases often invoke the “central role” of the Speech or 
Debate Clause “to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and 
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.”20 In Tenney v. 
Brandhove, the Court first formulated the legislative efficiency rationale, 
stating that “[t]he privilege would be of little value if [legislators] could be 
subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial.”21 
Supreme Court opinions on the Speech or Debate Clause following 
Tenney have continued to emphasize legislative efficiency.22 
The separation of powers and legislative efficiency rationales 
underlying federal Speech or Debate Clause opinions emphasize the 
importance of protecting the integrity of the legislative process. First, a 
broad legislative privilege protects the legislative process from harmful 
intrusions by the other branches of government.23 Second, it allows 
legislators to deliberate more “candidly and creatively” during the 
legislative process.24 
The ultimate purpose of the legislative privilege is not to further the 
interests of individual legislators, but rather to protect representative 
democracy.25 Coffin v. Coffin, an 1808 decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court that heavily influenced later Court decisions, 
reasoned that “[t]hese privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of 
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to 
support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to 
execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions.”26 For 
this reason, the legislative privilege afforded by the Speech or Debate 
Clause does not extend to all actions of federal legislators, but only those 
 
 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Gravel 
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); 
Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980). 
20. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617 (citing United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)). See Johnson, 
383 U.S. at 181.  
21. 341 U.S. at 377. 
22. See, e.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503 (“[A] private civil action, whether for an injunction or 
damages, creates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their 
legislative tasks to defend the litigation.”). 
23. See Huefner, supra note 1, at 270. 
24. Id. 
25. See, e.g., id. at 229 (“From its parliamentary origins, the legislative privilege has been 
defended not in terms of protecting the representatives themselves, but of advancing the interests of 
the public at large.”). 
26. 4 Mass. 1, 27 (Mass. 1808) (emphasis added). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] DRAWING THE LINE ON LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE 207 
 
 
 
 
within the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity.”27 In Gravel v. United 
States, the Court clarified that the Speech or Debate Clause shields 
legislative activity that is “an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative processes by which Members participate” in legislative 
proceedings and any other matters within the jurisdiction of either 
House.28 Moreover, Gravel extended the legislative privilege to 
encompass the legislative activities of congressional staff.29 
Based on the important principles underlying the legislative privilege, 
the Supreme Court has consistently “read the Speech or Debate Clause 
broadly to effectuate its purposes.”30 Once a member of the legislature is 
determined to be acting within the “legitimate legislative sphere,” the 
Speech or Debate Clause serves as an absolute bar to lawsuits against the 
legislator based on those actions.31 This absolute bar relieves an official of 
any obligation to justify his or her action by allowing the official to 
dismiss the suit on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.32 Thus, the privilege almost 
entirely eliminates the burden and expense of litigation.33 
One clear exception to the legislative privilege is that state legislators 
charged under federal criminal law do not receive absolute protection in 
federal court.34 Some commentators have emphasized of this deviation.35 
 
 
27. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 
501, 517 (1972) (“[T]he shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the integrity of 
the legislative process.”). Consequently, the application of the privilege often hinges on whether the 
action in question is within the legislative sphere. See, e.g., McNaughton v. McNaughton, 72 Pa. D. & 
C.4th 363, 375 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2005) (addressing the application of legislative privilege in the state 
context). 
28. 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). It is worth noting that the Speech or Debate Clause affords 
legislators both a “legislative immunity” and a “legislative privilege.” See Asta, supra note 5, at 244. 
The term “legislative immunity” is generally used to describe a legislator’s protection from criminal 
and civil suit for legislative acts. Id. On the other hand, the term “legislative privilege” generally refers 
to a legislator’s protection from compelled testimony or production of evidence concerning legislative 
acts. Id. Courts are occasionally imprecise in their use of these terms. Id. This Note is most concerned 
with “legislative privilege,” because this is the privilege invoked by legislators most often in the face 
of redistricting litigation. 
29. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625. 
30. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975). See United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966). 
31. Doe, 412 U.S. at 314. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503 (“We reaffirm that once it is determined 
that Members are acting within the ‘legitimate legislative sphere’ the Speech or Debate Clause is an 
absolute bar to interference.”).  
32. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1038–
39 (7th ed. 2015). 
33. Id. 
34. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 360 (1980). State legislative immunity in federal 
court is governed by federal common law and not the Constitution. Id. at 372 n.10. Therefore, unlike 
the constitutional protections afforded to members of Congress, the immunity of state legislators in 
federal court may yield where important federal interests are also at stake. Id. at 373. Gillock 
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However, the impact of this exception to absolute privilege is limited and 
likely to arise only when a state legislator runs afoul of a federal criminal 
law.36 
II. INTERPRETATION OF STATE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSES BY STATE 
COURTS 
Today, forty-eight states have constitutional provisions privileging 
state legislators to some degree from legal liability relating to legislative 
activities.37 The majority of states have maintained a version of the 
legislative privilege since their founding.38 Professor Steven Huefner has 
helpfully grouped state legislative provisions into five categories: 
(1) twenty-three states whose privilege exists under a constitutional 
provision essentially identical in text to the federal Speech or 
Debate Clause; (2) three states—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
and Vermont—that continue to employ a “deliberation, speech and 
debate” formulation of the privilege that . . . shortly predates the 
federal model; (3) twelve states that give legislators immunity “for 
words spoken [or uttered or used] in debate,” a formulation that 
appears to date from the middle of the nineteenth century; (4) five 
states that employ a formulation that protects legislators from being 
made “liable to answer” for their legislative statements;  and (5) 
seven states entirely without any constitutional language granting 
the privilege.39 
Despite considerable textual variation in legislative privilege provisions 
used by states, the nature of the privilege is relatively consistent across 
 
 
essentially established a balancing test to weigh the purposes of legislative immunity for state 
legislators against federal interests. Id. (“We conclude, therefore, that although principles of comity 
command careful consideration, our cases disclose that where important federal interests are at stake, 
as in the enforcement of federal criminal statutes, comity yields.”). 
35.  See, e.g., Asta, supra note 5, at 258 (arguing that Gillock’s qualification of the immunity of 
state legislators involved in federal criminal proceedings should be read broadly to extend to federal 
civil proceedings). See also Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 114 F. Supp. 3d 323, 332–36 
(E.D. Va. 2015); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d 135 
(Fla. 2013) (relying heavily on Gillock in balancing the legislative privilege against a competing state 
interest). 
36. See Huefner, supra note 1, at 304 (“[A]s long as state legislators steer clear of federal 
criminal law, they will not actually be any less well off than members of Congress.”). 
37. Id. at 237 n.54. 
38. Id. at 335.  
39. Id. at 236–37. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] DRAWING THE LINE ON LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE 209 
 
 
 
 
states.40 While an in-depth state-by-state examination of the legislative 
privilege is beyond the scope of this Note, legislative privilege derived 
from a Speech or Debate Clause has been a consistent mainstay of the 
majority of state constitutions, even through periods of sustained pressure 
to restrain legislative power.41 
Nevertheless, Professor Heufner’s review of state cases interpreting 
Speech or Debate Clauses in various states is evidence that some state 
courts interpret the legislative privilege more narrowly than federal 
courts.42 Recent departures from federal jurisprudence include New York 
trial courts holding that state legislators may be questioned about their 
legislative work in cases where they are not a party, and Ohio courts 
denying protection to state legislators from compelled questioning 
regarding legislative work.43 In addition, the increasing popularity of 
transparency in government and the passage of “sunshine” laws encourage 
openness in government processes.44 An absolute privilege protecting 
 
 
40. Id. at 239 (“[The] above textual differences among the various Speech or Debate clauses in 
state constitutions appear to reflect stylistic adjustments in the phrasing of the privilege, more than 
substantive differences in the nature of the privilege, and instead correlate most closely with the period 
in which each provision was adopted.”). See also Shelby Sklar, Note, The Impact of Social Media on 
the Legislative Process: How the Speech or Debate Clause Could Be Interpreted, 10 NW. J. L. & SOC. 
POL'Y 389, 409 (2015) (“[T]he general scholarship and relative lack of jurisprudence on the subject 
matter seem to form a consensus that most state constitutional speech or debate clauses are proxies for 
the federal Clause.”). 
41. See Huefner, supra note 1, at 242.   
42. Huefner, supra note 1, at 224 (citing State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1984); Colo. 
Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1991); Luscomb v. Bowker, 136 N.E.2d 192 (Mass. 
1956); Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, Nos. 178228, 178330, 1996 Mich. App. LEXIS 2245 
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1996); Mich. Educ. Special Servs. Ass'n v. Ins. Comm'r, 542 N.W.2d 354 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal dismissed, ordered not precedential; In re Prange, 550 N.W.2d 536 
(Mich. 1996); Pataki v. N.Y. State Assembly, 738 N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002); Abrams v. 
Richmond County S.P.C.C., 479 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Lincoln Bldg. Assocs. v. Barr, 
147 N.Y.S.2d 178 (N.Y. 1955); DeRolph v. State, 747 N.E.2d 823 (Ohio 2001); City of Dublin v. 
State, 742 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); DeRolph v. State, No. 22043 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. filed 
Aug. 4, 1998) (mem.); Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069 (Okla. 1993); Dadisman v. Moore, 
384 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1989)). See also Urb. Just. Ctr. v. Pataki, 810 N.Y.S.2d 826, 835 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2005), aff'd, 828 N.Y.S.2d 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (denying privilege for the allocation of funds 
for legislative activities). Other recent state interpretations are arguably narrower than the federal 
standard, but support their conclusions within the federal framework by construing the activity in 
question as outside of the legislative sphere. See McNaughton v. McNaughton, 72 Pa. D. & C.4th 363, 
375 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2005) (denying privilege for banking documents considered insufficiently 
legislative); State v. Chvala, 678 N.W.2d 880, 894 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004), aff'd, 693 N.W.2d 747 (Wis. 
2005) (denying privilege for managing state employees engaging in campaign activities). 
43. See Huefner, supra note 1, at 225–26. 
44. Id. at 227. Passed in 1966, the Federal Freedom of Information Act enables citizens to access 
the records of federal agencies upon request. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 553–56 (4th ed. 2014); THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS, FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE 2 (10th ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.rcfp.org/. The Government in the Sunshine Act was enacted in 1976 to provide public 
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legislators from producing or explaining their work is antithetical to the 
ideal of open government.45  
The contemporary push for open government has the potential to 
drown out the historic rationales behind the Speech or Debate Clause and 
legislative privilege.46 Redistricting litigation is one context that implicates 
the legislative privilege.47 Due to the special democratic problems that 
redistricting presents48 and high public awareness of the issue,49 there is 
danger of an initial response in favor of maximum transparency. However, 
this response must be resisted. When interpreting states’ respective Speech 
or Debate Clauses in the context of a redistricting case, three principles 
outweigh any other concerns: proper respect for the separation of powers; 
the interest in legislative efficiency; and preserving the integrity of the 
legislative process. 
III.   STATE REDISTRICTING CHALLENGES THAT IMPLICATE SPEECH OR 
DEBATE CLAUSE PRIVILEGES 
Part III examines the impact of state Speech or Debate Clauses on state 
redistricting cases. It introduces necessary background information about 
gerrymandering and considers some of the main developments in federal 
redistricting litigation. Part III then suggests that state court is a viable 
forum for redistricting challenges and considers the implications of state 
Speech or Debate Clauses in three representative state redistricting cases. 
A.  Background of State Redistricting Challenges and the Role of State 
Courts 
Redistricting challenges contest the constitutionality of redistricting 
legislation by alleging that legislators have impermissibly engaged in 
gerrymandering.50 Gerrymandering is the process of creating electoral 
districts in a way that provides a self-serving electoral benefit to the 
 
 
access to government meetings. Id. All states have similar laws that provide access to government files 
and proceedings. Id. at 6; ASIMOW & LEVIN, at 572. Although these laws generally apply to 
administrative agencies and not the legislature, they are relevant insofar as they evidence a popular 
trend toward transparency in government. See generally THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS, FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE.  
45. Huefner, supra note 1, at 227. 
46. Id. at 224–29. 
47. See supra note 3. 
48. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
49. Id. 
50. See Asta, supra note 5, at 241.   
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political party drawing the lines.51 There are two main categories of 
gerrymandering: racial gerrymandering and partisan gerrymandering.52 
This Note focuses solely on partisan gerrymandering cases. The analysis 
contained herein does not extend to racial gerrymandering.53 Partisan 
gerrymandering presents serious challenges to the American democratic 
system, including legislative self-entrenchment, undeserved partisan 
advantage, and public disillusionment.54 
Partisan gerrymandering challenges are extremely difficult to bring in 
federal court.55 The United States Supreme Court first squarely addressed 
partisan gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer.56 The Bandemer majority 
held that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable.57 Moreover, the 
 
 
51. See Michael Weaver, Note, Uncertainty Maintained: The Split Decision Over Partisan 
Gerrymanders in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1273, 1277 (2005). See also AMERICAN BAR 
ASS’N, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 3 (1981) (defining “gerrymander” as “the drawing of district 
boundary lines for the purpose of giving some individual or group a political advantage”). The term 
“gerrymander” was developed in 1812 when a salamander-shaped district was signed into law by 
Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry. ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
GERRYMANDER 16–17 (Leon Stein ed., ArnoPress 1974) (1907). 
52. Weaver, supra note 51, at 1278. 
53. The case law similarly distinguishes between racial and partisan gerrymandering cases. See, 
e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124–25 (1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293–95 
(2004). These two cases come to different conclusions. On the one hand, the majority in Bandemer 
reasoned that the submission of a claim “by a political group, rather than a racial group, does not 
distinguish it in terms of justiciability.” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 125. On the other hand, the plurality in 
Vieth refused to treat political and racial gerrymandering equivalently. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293–95. The 
plurality reasoned that a “purpose to discriminate on the basis of race receives the strictest scrutiny 
under the Equal Protections Clause, while a similar purpose to discriminate on the basis of politics 
does not.” Id. at 293. This distinction aided the plurality in rejecting Justice Stevens’ view that political 
gerrymanders can be analyzed under the same judicial standard used in racial gerrymander cases. See 
infra note 60 and accompanying text.  
54. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 491, 516 (1997) (describing bipartisan gerrymandering as a clear example of legislative 
entrenchment); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
601–11 (2002) (offering three categories of the harms of partisan gerrymandering through the lens of 
Supreme Court apportionment case law); Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 133 (acknowledging that 
gerrymandering could frustrate the will of the majority); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for 
Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 860 (1997) (“Redistricting conducted by state 
legislatures fosters disillusionment with the democratic process because it more deeply ingrains upon 
the American psyche the image of politicians as self-interested actors feathering their own nests.”) 
(emphasis added). 
55. See Asta, supra note 5, at 241–42 (“[C]ourts have struggled with adjudicating redistricting 
claims because they have often been forced to base their decisions solely on circumstantial evidence 
like the shape of the districts involved and the partisan and racial make-up of the populations in those 
districts.”). 
56. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
57. Id. at 125 (“[T]hat the claim is submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group, does 
not distinguish it in terms of justiciability.”). Under the political question doctrine, the Court considers 
the prudential question of whether a manageable judicial standard exists for evaluating a claim before 
taking jurisdiction. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 32, at 253–54.  
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Bandemer majority agreed that a successful partisan gerrymandering claim 
requires: (1) proof of discriminatory effect, and (2) intentional legislative 
discrimination against a specific group.58 However, in the face of the 
legislative privilege, the legislative intent of Bandemer’s second prong is 
virtually impossible to know.59 Moreover, in a subsequent case, Vieth v. 
Jubelirer,60 the Court essentially rendered federal partisan gerrymandering 
cases non-justiciable over concerns about devising a manageable standard 
for evaluating claims.61 In assessing standards for evaluating a partisan 
gerrymandering claim, the plurality in Vieth concluded that it was 
impossible to discern the predominant intent of legislative map-makers 
and that the appellants’ proposed “effects” prong was inadequate because 
there was no constitutional right to proportional representation.62 In his 
dissent, Justice Stevens argued that partisan gerrymandering could be 
analyzed under the same standard used in racial gerrymandering cases.63 
Although a recent District Court decision in Wisconsin found a judicially 
manageable standard for political gerrymandering, the Supreme Court has 
not yet opined on the standard.64  
State courts provide an alternate, potentially more desirable forum for 
redistricting plan challengers because claims of partisan gerrymandering 
do not necessarily face the preliminary justiciability hurdle.65 Furthermore, 
state court is a natural place to litigate redistricting claims because 
 
 
58. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127. 
59. See Asta, supra note 5, at 261 (“If plaintiffs do not have access to the legislative motivations 
behind redistricting legislation, proving that intent becomes a near-Herculean feat.”). But see 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129 (“As long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very 
difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.”). 
60. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
61. The plurality in Vieth stated: “[N]o judicially discernable and manageable standards for 
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged [in the eighteen years since Bandemer] . . . 
. [P]olitical gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and . . . Bandemer was wrongly decided.” Id. at 
281. Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote dismissing the gerrymandering claim, but wrote a 
separate opinion leaving open the possibility of justiciability. Id. at 306. 
62. Id. at 288. 
63. Id. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also FALLON ET AL., supra note 32, at 254. The 
factors considered in racial gerrymandering cases are: the irregularity of the district lines, the purpose 
of the line drawing, the process by which the redistricting plans were enacted, and other evidence 
demonstrating purely improper motivations. Id. 
64. Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-CV-421-BBC, 2016 WL 6837229, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 
2016). The plaintiffs in Whitford utilized an “efficiency gap” formula as a standard to measure partisan 
gerrymandering practices. Id. at *50–52. The “efficiency gap” metric is promising because it provides 
a clear mathematical formula for assessing partisanship in a district. Michael Wines, Judges Find 
Wisconsin Redistricting Unfairly Favored Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2016, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/wisconsin-redistricting-found-to-unfairly-favor-
republicans.html. 
65. States have different standing rules than the federal court system. See FALLON ET AL., supra 
note 32, at 158.  
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redistricting is a process almost wholly governed and controlled by the 
states.66 States also impose a number of constraints on the redistricting 
process that could merit judicial scrutiny.67 In 2015, in League of Women 
Voters of Florida v. Detzner, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the 
viability of redistricting challenges in state courts when it invalidated the 
Florida legislature’s redistricting map as impermissible partisan 
gerrymandering.68 
Although very few state courts have considered state legislative 
privilege protections in the context of partisan redistricting litigation, the 
following cases provide a basis for understanding state concerns in such 
circumstances.  
B.  State Redistricting Cases Implicating Speech or Debate Clause 
Protections 
Where state Speech or Debate Clauses have been implicated in state 
redistricting litigation, the trend has been to apply the legislative privilege 
to block access to legislative materials.69 In Florida, the only state where 
legislative privilege was denied in a redistricting case, the substantive state 
law was distinguishable from other states.70 
In Edwards v. Vesilind, the Supreme Court of Virginia construed the 
Speech or Debate Clause of the Virginia Constitution to allow for a broad 
legislative privilege protecting legislators and their aides from document 
production in relation to a redistricting challenge.71 The redistricting 
challengers in Edwards alleged that certain districts violated a Virginia 
constitutional provision requiring districts to be contiguous, compact,72 
 
 
66. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §2); Chapman 
v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975). 
67. The following are common criteria imposed by states: “(1) contiguous and compact districts, 
(2) respect for political subdivisions (especially counties), (3) respect for geographic or natural 
boundaries, and (4) coterminality between state house and state senate districts.” Kubin, supra note 54, 
at 851. 
68. 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015). This case should not be confused with League of Women Voters 
of Florida v. Florida House of Representatives. 132 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 2013). 
69. See Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d 469 (Va. 2016); Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976 (R.I. 
1984). 
70. League of Women Voters of Florida v. Florida House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d 135 
(Fla. 2013). 
71. Edwards, 790 S.E.2d at 469. 
72. Id. It is not uncommon for redistricting challengers to dispute the compactness of legislative 
districts. A compact district is distinguished from one that is an odd shape. Kurtis A. Kemper, 
Application of Constitutional “Compactness Requirement” to Redistricting, 114 A.L.R.5th 311 
(2003). Most state constitutions include a constitutional provision requiring compactness. Id. See infra 
note 129. The inquiry into compactness can be conducted based on the objective shape of the district 
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and as nearly equal in population as possible.73 The challengers sought a 
declaration that the districts were unconstitutional, an injunction against 
the use of the map in subsequent elections, and other equitable relief as 
necessary.74 The dispute in Edwards centered on the production of 
documents by Virginia legislators and the Division of Legislative Services 
(DLS), a non-partisan legislative agency that supports Virginia 
legislators.75 In its opinion, the court addressed three distinct aspects of the 
legislative privilege under the state Speech or Debate Clause: (1) the 
nature of the protection afforded, (2) to what the privilege applies, and (3) 
to whom the privilege applies.76 
The Supreme Court of Virginia began its analysis by emphasizing the 
rich history of the Speech or Debate Clause and its importance to the 
ideals of separation of powers and representative government.77 The court 
also noted that this was the first time the state clause had been interpreted, 
and that federal Speech or Debate Clause case law provided guidance 
because both clauses are “based upon the same historical and public policy 
considerations.”78  
The court first held that the legislative privilege under the state Clause 
extends beyond immunity from prosecution to encompass production of 
documentary evidence.79 The court reasoned that this conclusion was 
necessary to protect the separation of powers, to defend the integrity of the 
legislative process, and to prevent the distraction of legislators from their 
duties.80 Second, relying primarily on federal Speech or Debate Clause 
precedent, the court held that the legislative privilege applies only to acts 
within the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity.”81 Third, the court 
 
 
and does not require a showing of intent. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284–88 (2004) 
(discussing compactness as a goal separate from intent). 
73. Edwards, 790 S.E.2d at 469. The provision in question was Article II, Section 6 of the 
Constitution of Virginia. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 472–74.   
76. Id. at 477. 
77. Id. (“The Clause was not introduced into the Constitution of Virginia devoid of history or 
context, nor should it be interpreted as if it had.”). 
78. Id. at 476. 
79. Id. at 478 (“Protection from compulsory production of privileged evidence is a necessary 
corollary to immunity.”). 
80. Id. at 478–79. 
81. Id. at 479–80 (citing United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972); United States v. 
Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972)). “Legislative 
actions include, but are not limited to, delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in 
debate; proposing legislation; voting on legislation; making, publishing, presenting, and using 
legislative reports; authorizing investigations and issuing subpoenas; and holding hearings and 
introducing materials at Committee hearings.” Edwards, 790 S.E.2d at 479 (quoting Board of 
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held that the evidentiary legislative privilege applied to legislators, DLS 
employees, and legislative consultants.82 In so holding, the court again 
relied heavily on federal Speech or Debate Clause precedent.83 The 
Virginia Supreme Court’s holding indicates that the privilege is broad in 
Virginia and largely mirrors the federal protection afforded members of 
Congress. As discussed in Part IV, the Virginia Supreme Court’s approach 
is ideal and adequately values the important principles of separation of 
powers, legislative efficiency, and representative democracy. 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has also interpreted its state 
Speech or Debate Clause to protect legislators whose actions were 
challenged in the redistricting context. In Holmes v. Farmer, redistricting 
challengers sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and a court-
ordered redistricting plan to combat Rhode Island’s 1982 
Reapportionment Act (the Act).84 The challengers alleged that the Act 
violated compactness and equal protections requirements. They also 
argued that the Act contained plans that were gerrymandered to serve 
political purposes and to dilute the voting strength of women and political 
and ethnic minorities.85 The court considered the question of whether 
testimonial evidence of individual legislators and their aides could be 
introduced at trial.86 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the state Speech or Debate 
Clause provided legislators with a testimonial privilege that was “clearly 
within the most basic elements of legislative privilege.”87 Despite the state 
Speech and Debate Clause’s long history, the court noted that this was the 
 
 
Supervisors v. Davenport Co., 742 S.E.2d 59, 63 (Va. 2013)). 
82. Id. at 480–83.   
83. Id. at 481. The court’s analysis relied heavily on Gravel, which extended the legislative 
privilege to “alter egos” of legislators, typically aides and consultants who perform legislative 
functions vital to the legislative process. 408 U.S. at 617. See also supra note 29 and accompanying 
text. The Virginia Supreme Court analyzed whether an individual is an “alter ego” of the legislator 
along three factors: the individual’s relationship to the legislator, the individual’s identity, and the 
source or terms of the individual’s pay. Edwards, 790 S.E.2d at 481–83. 
84. Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 978 (R.I. 1984). 
85. Id. The challengers also alleged that certain legislators engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to 
deprive voters of equal protection and that the plans violated a state constitutional requirement that 
redistricting plans partially comply with municipal-representation apportionment formulae. Id. The 
import of Holmes to this Note should be constrained to the case’s political dimensions. As stated in 
Part III, Subsection A, the analysis in this Note does not extend to racial gerrymandering cases. 
86. Id. at 980 (“The evidence was principally offered to show that the Reapportionment 
Commission used a ± 2.5 percent target deviation in drawing district lines, that the commission 
members were politically motivated when they decided on district boundaries, and that the members 
were ignorant of applicable laws by which they were required to abide.”).   
87. Id. at 984. 
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first time that it had been interpreted.88 As a result, the court relied heavily 
on federal precedent interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause of the 
Constitution.89 The court reasoned that testimony concerning legislator 
actions and motivations in passing the reapportionment plan was part of 
the legislative process.90 The court also noted that an inquiry into the 
legislators’ motives would hinder the “free flow of debate” within the 
legislative branch and militate against the separation of powers between 
co-equal branches of government.91 As in Edwards v. Vesilind, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court in Holmes interpreted its state Speech or Debate 
Clause broadly.92 Again, this approach represents a sensible application of 
the state Speech or Debate Clause that comports with the proposal in Part 
IV. 
In League of Women Voters of Florida v. Florida House of 
Representatives, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the legislative 
privilege must yield to a competing state constitutional prohibition against 
partisan gerrymandering.93 Unlike Virginia and Rhode Island, Florida does 
not have a Speech or Debate Clause in its state constitution.94 
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court held in League of Women Voters 
that state legislators and legislative staff members possess a legislative 
privilege under the Florida Constitution’s separation of powers 
provision.95 Despite this finding, legislators were deemed unprotected by 
the evidentiary privilege in the redistricting context due to a competing 
constitutional provision against partisan gerrymandering.96 
 
 
88. Id. at 980–81.   
89. Id. at 981 (“In order to interpret this provision adequately, we must look at the history of this 
section as well as the interpretation of a similar provision in the United States Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 
6).”). 
90. Id. at 984 (“[I]t is apparent that the thrust of plaintiffs’ questioning would have involved 
matters that directly relate to the legislators’ motivations and actions in proposing and carrying out the 
House plan.”). Here the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on the federal precedent in United States 
v. Brewster, stating that if an action is protected, it must fall within the “legitimate legislative sphere.” 
Id. 
91. Id. In reference to the “free flow of debate” rationale, many commentators worry that placing 
limits on the legislative privilege will have a “chilling effect.” See, e.g., Heufner, supra note 1, at 276. 
The essence of the argument is that subjecting legislators to compelled testimony will discourage them 
from engaging in open deliberations about legislative matters. 
92. Holmes, 475 A.2d at 981 (“We do not accept plaintiff’s contention that there is a relevant 
difference between the federal provision . . . and the state provision . . . .”). 
93. 132 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 2013). 
94. Id. at 143 (“Florida is one of only two states in the country that lacks either a state 
constitutional Speech or Debate Clause or a provision protecting legislators from arrest during 
legislative session.”). See also Huefner, supra note 1, at 237, n.54 (stating that Florida is one of seven 
states without a constitutional provision explicitly granting legislative privilege). 
95. League of Women Voters, 132 So. 3d at 143. 
96. Id.  
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A provision of the Florida Constitution approved by Florida voters in 
2010 prohibits legislators from engaging in partisan or racial 
gerrymandering when creating district plans.97 In League of Women 
Voters, the redistricting challengers disputed the validity of the 2012 
congressional apportionment plan.98 The challengers alleged that state 
legislators violated Article III, section 20 of the Florida Constitution by 
favoring incumbents, intentionally diminishing the ability of minorities to 
select representatives of their choice, and failing to adhere to compactness 
standards and existing political and geographic boundaries where 
appropriate.99 The challengers attempted to support these claims with 
documented communications between legislators, third parties, and direct 
depositions of state legislators.100 The Florida legislature responded by 
seeking a protective order to prevent the depositions and discovery of 
materials relating to the redistricting plans.101 
The court first held that a legislative privilege exists in Florida based 
on the principle of separation of powers found in Article II, section 3, of 
the Florida Constitution.102 The court reasoned that although Florida has a 
strong public policy favoring transparency and public access to the 
legislative process, that policy is outweighed by the crucial role that the 
separation of powers principle plays in the state government.103 Second, 
the court held that the legislative privilege in Florida was not absolute and 
may yield to a “compelling, competing” interest.104 In so holding, the court 
employed a balancing test similar to the one used in United States v. 
Gillock,105 but balanced competing state, instead of federal, interests.106 
 
 
97. Id. at 139. Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution states that legislators may not 
create districts “with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent” and “with the 
intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to 
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice.” 
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a). 
98. League of Women Voters, 132 So. 3d at 140–41. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 141. 
101. Id.   
102. Id. Again, this was despite the absence of a Speech or Debate Clause in the Florida 
Constitution. 
103. Id. at 144–45. The court went on to support the recognition of a legislative privilege with 
many of the traditional rationales recognized in federal legislative privilege cases, including a concern 
for the integrity of the legislative process and the importance of freeing legislators from distraction. Id. 
at 146. 
104. Id. at 147 (“Once a court determines that the information being sought is within the scope 
of the legislative privilege, the court then must determine whether the purposes underlying the 
privilege . . . are outweighed by a compelling, competing interest.”). 
105. 445 U.S. 360 (1980) (balancing affording legislative privilege to state legislators in federal 
court on federal criminal charges against competing federal interests). 
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Applying this balancing test, the court held that Article III, section 20 of 
the Florida Constitution was a “compelling, competing” interest that 
outweighed the interests underlying the legislative privilege.107 Based on 
these holdings the court allowed discovery concerning the acts of the 
Florida legislators.108 
Although in League of Women Voters a state court limited the 
legislative privilege in the redistricting context, it is not relevant to other 
states. First, the lack of a Speech or Debate Clause in the Florida 
Constitution constrains the opinion. Although the court ultimately 
grounded the legislative privilege in separation of powers principles, the 
foundation of the privilege may have been stronger if it rested explicitly 
on a Speech or Debate Clause, which in federal precedent is also 
buttressed by principles such as legislative efficiency and representative 
government. Second, the opinion relied heavily on the balancing rationale 
of United States v. Gillock, 109 which is only applied by federal courts in 
very narrow circumstances. Moreover, as the dissent points out, the 
reliance on United States v. Gillock is inappropriate because it implicates 
federalism rather than separation of powers concerns.110 Third, the opinion 
goes against the majority trend of affording an absolute legislative 
privilege based on the example of federal Speech or Debate Clause 
precedent.111 Finally, the presence of a state constitutional provision 
explicitly prohibiting partisan gerrymandering was a determinative factor 
in the result.112 
IV.  A PROPOSED STATE SPEECH OR DEBATE FRAMEWORK 
Part VI proposes a framework for interpreting state Speech or Debate 
Clauses in the redistricting context. Specifically, it argues that a broad 
legislative privilege is necessary to protect the separation of powers, 
 
 
106. League of Women Voters, 132 So. 3d at 146–47. 
107. Id. at 154. 
108. Id. at 142–43. Despite allowing discovery generally, the court reserved for individual 
legislators and their staff the ability to assert a privilege for subjective thoughts or impressions 
concerning the legislative action. Id.  
109. Id. at 146–47. 
110. League of Women Voters, 132 So. 3d at 158 (Canady, J., dissenting) (“Gillock thus does not 
address the role that the legislative privilege plays in the separation of powers between the legislative 
and judicial branches. Instead, Gillock is a case about the scope of federal legislative power vis-à-vis 
state legislators.”). 
111. Both Edwards v. Vesilind and Holmes v. Farmer evidence this trend. See supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. 
112. This kind of provision provides a potential tool for redistricting challengers. It would be 
interesting to see how it would hold up in a case relying less heavily on Gillock. 
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legislative efficiency, and representative democracy. Acknowledging that 
this approach stymies efforts to combat partisan gerrymandering, this 
section then considers independent redistricting commissions as an 
appropriate remedy. 
State courts interpreting state Speech or Debate Clauses should follow 
the example of Edwards v. Vesilind, Holmes v. Farmer, and federal case 
law interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause in the Constitution and 
provide legislators with a broad legislative privilege. This broad privilege 
should not be abrogated in the context of state redistricting challenges. 
The legislative privilege afforded by Speech or Debate Clauses in state 
constitutions should be absolute, mirroring the absolute privilege afforded 
to members of Congress by the Constitution. The separation of powers 
principle demands this result. When the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches are acting within the same system, regardless of whether it is the 
federal or state system, it is essential that legislators be protected from 
“intimidation . . . by the Executive and accountability before a possibly 
hostile judiciary.”113 
The balancing approach applied in United States v. Gillock has no 
applicability to redistricting challenges in state court. First, Gillock only 
applies to criminal proceedings.114 Second, Gillock deals with state 
legislators in federal court rather than state legislators in state court.115 
This difference is crucial. In federal court, state legislators are not 
protected by a Speech or Debate Clause, and their immunity relies only on 
federal common law.116 Moreover, federalism concerns are relevant in the 
Gillock context.117 In state court, there is no federalism dimension and, in 
forty-eight states,118 legislators receive state constitutional protection. 
This approach avoids debasing the important principles of separation of 
powers, legislative efficiency, and representative democracy embodied in 
state Speech or Debate Clauses. Although state Speech or Debate Clauses 
may contribute to legislative self-entrenchment and partisan maneuvering, 
these negative effects are better addressed through alternate districting 
 
 
113. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972). See also United States v. Johnson, 383 
U.S. 169, 181 (1966). 
114. See Huefner, supra note 1, at 304 (“[A]s long as state legislators steer clear of federal 
criminal law, they will not actually be any less well off than members of Congress.”).  
115. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 361–62 (1980).  
116. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 114 F. Supp. 3d 323, 333 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
117. Id. (“[T]he separation of powers principle ‘gives no support to the grant’ of evidentiary use 
immunity to state legislators in ‘those areas where the Constitution grants the Federal Government the 
power to act’ because ‘the Supremacy Clause dictates that federal enactments will prevail over 
competing state exercises of power.”) (quoting United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 370 (1980)). 
118. See Huefner, supra note 1, at 237 n.54.   
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safeguards like independent redistricting commissions. Independent 
redistricting commissions combat self-entrenchment and partisan 
maneuvering without jeopardizing the importance of a broad legislative 
privilege. Rather than abrogating state Speech or Debate Clauses in an 
effort to fight the harms of partisan gerrymandering, states should focus on 
addressing the problems of gerrymandering head on. 
A.  Independent State Redistricting Commissions as an Alternative to 
Speech or Debate Clause Abrogation 
Independent redistricting commissions provide a promising avenue for 
addressing the harms of partisan gerrymandering without endangering the 
principles of separation of powers, legislative efficiency, and 
representative democracy embodied in state Speech or Debate Clauses.119 
In fact, the use of independent redistricting commissions may even 
reinforce these principles, especially legislative efficiency and 
representative government. Though not a perfect answer to the 
gerrymandering problem, independent commissions are the best 
mechanism for mitigating the self-entrenchment and anti-democratic 
behavior that could be shielded by legislative privilege.120 
Independent redistricting commissions have been used in several states 
for a number of years.121 Although state legislatures historically have 
controlled redistricting, many states began to reform their redistricting 
mechanisms following the landmark apportionment decision in Baker v. 
Carr.122 Today, about half of states use a form of commission for the 
drawing of either state legislative or congressional districts.123 In 2015, the 
Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned a state’s use of an independent 
 
 
119. See, e.g., Kubin, supra note 54, at 838 (“[W]hile commissions are no panacea, they offer a 
viable means of restoring a degree of efficiency, fairness, and finality to a state’s decennial 
gerrymander.”). 
120. See Note, A Federal Administrative Approach to Redistricting Reform, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1842, 1852–53, (2008) [hereinafter A Federal Administrative Approach] (“One can certainly debate 
the most effective commission structure or decision rules, but the bottom line is that independent 
commissions are less likely to distort the process than are partisan legislators, who will most certainly 
manipulate the rules of the game to their advantage.”) (internal citation omitted). See also Kubin, 
supra note 54, at 840 (“To paraphrase Winston Churchill, commissions are the worst method of 
redistricting except for all those other methods that have been tried from time to time.”). But see, e.g., 
Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding the Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence 
to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 650 (2002) (“[R]edistricting by 
politically insulated commissions . . . is both undesirable in theory and difficult to create in fact.”). 
121. A Federal Administrative Approach, supra note 120, at 1852. 
122. Kubin, supra note 54 at 841. 
123. Ryan P. Bates, Note, Congressional Authority to Require State Adoption of Independent 
Redistricting Commissions, 55 DUKE L.J. 333, 346 (2005). 
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redistricting commission in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission.124 
B. Independent State Redistricting Commission Forms 
Independent redistricting commissions take many forms.125 Two key 
criteria can be used to distinguish among the different commission forms: 
responsibility for the redistricting process and membership structure.126  
In terms of responsibility, redistricting commissions typically have 
either primary or backup authority.127 The most common form of 
commission responsibility, the primary commission, initiates the 
redistricting process and, depending on the state, completes the process 
within a specified period and with varying degrees of legislative 
oversight.128 The “less-common” backup commission steps in only if the 
state legislature fails to produce a suitable plan.129  
Membership, the other principle aspect of redistricting commissions, 
typically falls into one of three categories: tie-breaker, bipartisan, and 
blue-ribbon panels.130 While no membership formula is perfect, the 
consensus is that tie-breaking commissions offer the best opportunity to 
reduce partisanship and preserve competition.131 Tie-breaker commissions 
 
 
124. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2652 (2015). 
125. Bates, supra note 123, at 346. See also Kubin, supra note 54, at 842 (“In the tradition of 
allowing the states to be test beds for new experiments in democratic government, the seventeen states 
that have adopted some form of redistricting commission all employ significantly different versions of 
the basic concept.”). 
126. Compare Bates, supra note 123, at 346, with Kubin, supra note 54, at 843–51 
(differentiating independent redistricting criteria according to (1) the scope of their statutory or 
constitutional authority, (2) their membership, and (3) the requirement of mandatory state review). 
These two methods of classification largely overlap. However, Kubin helpfully discusses how some 
states have limited state judicial review of commission plans. Id. at 850. This usually involves granting 
state supreme courts original jurisdiction in all challenges to a commission’s plan. Id. States like 
Colorado have mandated that the state supreme court automatically review each redistricting plan 
whether or not it has been challenged by a third party. Id. 
127. Bates, supra note 123, at 347. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 347–48. A redistricting plan may be deemed unsuitable for several reasons. 
Redistricting plans must comply with the federal “one person, one vote” standard and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. See A Federal Administrative Approach, supra note 120, at 1842; Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses 
of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”). In addition to federal 
requirements, the majority of states also require certain criteria when drawing new lines. Kubin, supra 
note 54, at 851. Kubin outlines the following common criteria: “(1) contiguous and compact districts, 
(2) respect for political subdivisions (especially counties), (3) respect for geographic or natural 
boundaries, and (4) coterminality between state house and state senate districts.” Id. 
130. Bates, supra note 123, at 348–49. 
131. Id. at 351 (arguing that tie-breaking commissions offer the best solution to political and 
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are “composed of equal members from a state’s two major political parties 
plus a tie-breaking chairman.”132 Typically, the chairman is chosen by a 
majority vote of the partisan members, forcing them to compromise on an 
individual trusted to be relatively independent.133 However, some states 
rely on the state supreme court to choose the chairman or allow the 
supreme court to appoint a chairman if the partisan committee members 
cannot come to a consensus.134  
Another option for committee membership is the bipartisan model. In 
contrast to the tie-breaker commission, bipartisan commissions lack a 
commissioner and are made up of equal numbers of each major party.135 
The bipartisan model is rarely used, often leads to partisan gridlock, and 
can encourage bipartisan gerrymandering whereby partisan members work 
across the aisle to protect incumbency.136  
Finally, a third type of redistricting commission, the blue-ribbon panel, 
consists of high-ranking state officers.137 This membership structure does 
not address partisanship in redistricting because the occupants of most 
state offices are partisan figures.138 
C.  Independent Redistricting Commissions Reduce Partisan Bias and 
Incumbent Self-Entrenchment  
Independent redistricting commissions address two consistently 
articulated harms of partisan gerrymandering: partisan bias and incumbent 
self-entrenchment.139 As alluded to above, the tie-breaker commission is 
the best arrangement to mitigate both harms.140 Tie-breaker commissions 
 
 
judicial conflicts in the redistricting process). See also Kubin, supra note 54, at 846 (“The tie-breaking 
membership formula has three advantages. First, the commission is bipartisan . . . . Second, the tie-
breaking vote ensures that the redistricting process does not end in deadlock . . . . Third, the presence 
of a tie-breaking chairman should encourage both parties to negotiate in good faith and offer 
reasonable alternative plans.”).  
132. Kubin, supra note 54, at 845.  
133. Bates, supra note 123, at 350. 
134. Kubin, supra note 54, at 845–46. 
135. Bates, supra note 123, at 349. 
136. Id. Four states implement the bipartisan model: Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, and 
Washington.  Id. at 349 n.93. 
137. Id. at 350. For example, in Texas, the lieutenant governor, the speaker of the House, the 
attorney general, the state comptroller, and the land commissioner comprise the backup redistricting 
commission. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28. 
138. Kubin, supra note 54, at 846–47. 
139. See Issacharoff, supra note 54, at 644; A Federal Administrative Approach, supra note 120, 
at 1844 (“Criticism of political gerrymanders has generally focused on the dual harms of partisan bias 
and incumbent entrenchment.”). 
140. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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encourage negotiation and compromise among the major political 
parties.141 Moreover, partisan and incumbency motivations are constrained 
“by the fear of losing the  chairman’s vote.”142 The tie-breaker commission 
also mitigates partisan gerrymandering without eliminating the desirable 
political character of the redistricting process.143 Instead, political actors 
operate within an adversarial structure that encourages outcomes aligned 
with the public interest.144 
The use of independent redistricting commissions also has important 
downstream benefits.145 Independent commissions have been shown to 
increase the competitiveness of districts.146 Increased competitiveness 
could increase legislator responsiveness to voter constituencies and reduce 
voter apathy.147 In addition, independent redistricting commissions could 
foster legislative efficiency and economy by relieving legislators of the 
time-consuming task of redistricting and limiting administrative costs and 
extended litigation.148 Increased legislator responsiveness to public 
demands and the promotion of legislative efficiency correspond with the 
key principles animating the legislative privilege. Therefore, independent 
redistricting commissions, particularly tie-breaker commissions, and the 
legislative privilege are natural counterparts in the redistricting context.  
D.  The Downside to Independent Commissions: Implementation 
Despite the promise of independent redistricting committees, 
formidable obstacles hinder their adoption. Principally, it is difficult to 
 
 
141. Kubin, supra note 54, at 850. See also Bates, supra note 123, at 352 (“[A] holdout dynamic 
is unlikely to emerge in tie-breaker commissions. Because losing the tie-breaking vote means that the 
opponent’s proposal succeeds, the cost of holding out is very high.”). 
142. Kubin, supra note 54, at 850. See Bates, supra note 123, at 350–51 (“This design promotes 
bipartisan cooperation and discourages stonewalling.”). 
143. Bates, supra note 123, at 353. Kubin refers to this as the “fair fight.” Kubin, supra note 54, 
at 856. 
144. Bates, supra note 123, at 353. (“Many of our governmental institutions . . . rely on the 
adversarial process, tempered by institutional checks and balances, to work in the public interest; 
removing redistricting from the hands of self-interested legislators would more accurately align the 
process with this tradition.”). See Kubin, supra note 54, at 856 (“[T]he theory supporting a tie-
breaking commission is that egregious gerrymanders can be avoided and balance promoted by 
monitoring the redistricting process through a comprehensive system of checks and balances.”). 
145. See Bates, supra note 123, at 353–54.  
146. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 54, at 626 (“It is probably not a matter of coincidence that 
in Iowa, where congressional boundaries are drawn by nonpartisan officials who are instructed to 
disregard incumbent and other political preferences, four out of five House districts were considered 
highly competitive in 2002.”). 
147. See Bates, supra note 123, at 353. See also Kubin, supra note 54, at 859–60 (“[Tie-breaking 
commissions] can restore public confidence in our democratic system of representation.”). 
148. Bates, supra note 123, at 353. 
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force legislators to voluntarily cede their power to redistrict.149 For 
example, recent legislative conversion efforts in Kansas and North 
Carolina failed to gain momentum during the legislative process.150 This 
difficulty has led to various creative academic proposals, ranging from the 
creation of a federal agency authorized to review partisan redistricting—
with an eye toward incentivizing independent commissions151—to 
imposing a corporate law-style fiduciary duty on legislators and allowing 
them to “cleanse” problematic maps with the use of independent 
commissions.152 Although deciding the optimal incentive scheme for 
achieving increased use of independent commissions is beyond the scope 
of this Note, it is encouraging that numerous proposals have been made 
surrounding implementation. An attitude that independent commissions 
are an ideal avenue for addressing partisan gerrymandering has pervaded 
the judicial branch.153 Moreover, successful conversions from legislator-
controlled redistricting to redistricting-by-commission have been 
accomplished in the last several years by popular referendum.154 
CONCLUSION 
Although it is tempting to adopt a framework that would allow for 
potentially damning gerrymandering documents to be released, failing to 
strongly enforce state Speech or Debate Clause protections would lead to 
negative effects for the United States system of government. Federal 
Speech or Debate Clause precedent grasps the importance of the 
separation of powers and legislative efficiency to the legislative process by 
applying an absolute legislative privilege in nearly all cases. Following the 
lead of Virginia and Rhode Island, states should embrace federal 
interpretations of the Speech or Debate Clause when considering a state 
clause in the redistricting context. Moreover, state citizens and legislators 
should seek to address the issue of partisan gerrymandering in creative 
ways that do not infringe upon important constitutional values. One 
promising method is to restrict the free reign of partisan legislators over 
 
 
149. Id. at 355–56. 
150. Id. 
151. A Federal Administrative Approach, supra note 120, at 1842. 
152. D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 679 (2013). 
153. Kubin, supra note 54, at 862–68. See also A Federal Administrative Approach, supra note 
120, at 1853 (acknowledging that state-level transitions to independent commissions are more likely to 
succeed than federal reforms but worrying that piece-meal state adoption could lead to an unfair 
overall system in which one major political party gains an advantage by gerrymandering more 
frequently). 
154. Bates, supra note 123, at 355–56. 
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the redistricting process by using tie-breaker redistricting commissions. 
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